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The unconditional security of a quantum key distribution protocol is often defined in terms of
the accessible information, that is, the maximum mutual information between the distributed key S
and the outcome of an optimal measurement on the adversary’s (quantum) system. We show that,
even if this quantity is small, certain parts of the key S might still be completely insecure when S is
used in applications, such as for one-time pad encryption. This flaw is due to a locking property of
the accessible information: one additional (physical) bit of information might increase the accessible
information by more than one bit.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd
I. SECRECY IN CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Secret keys play an important role in cryptography.
They are used for various tasks such as the encryption
or authentication of messages. Clearly, the security of
these cryptographic tasks strongly depends on the level
of secrecy of the underlying key.
The strongest and thus most desirable notion of secu-
rity for a secret key S is called perfect security and is
characterized by two conditions:
(i) any value of S is equally likely (i.e., the distribution
PS is uniform on a key space S);
(ii) an adversary has no information on S (i.e., the state
of any system controlled by an adversary is indepen-
dent of the value of S).
Such a perfectly secure key allows for the realization of
highly secure cryptographic schemes. For example, if S
is used as a one-time pad [18] to encrypt a message M ,
the resulting ciphertext C is independent of M and thus
completely useless for an adversary.
It turns out, however, that—even with the help of
quantum mechanics—it is generally impossible to gen-
erate perfectly secure keys. One thus usually considers
slightly weakened security definitions. For example, con-
dition (ii) might be substituted by a bound on the in-
formation that the adversary has on S. This, however,
∗Electronic address: r.t.koenig@damtp.cam.ac.uk
†Electronic address: r.renner@damtp.cam.ac.uk
‡Electronic address: andor.m.bariska@weiss.ch
§Electronic address: maurer@inf.ethz.ch
raises questions such as: What is an appropriate mea-
sure to quantify the adversary’s information on S? How
to choose the upper bound on this information such that
it is guaranteed that S can safely be used in applications?
In the context of classical information-theoretic cryp-
tography [19], the adversary’s knowledge on a key S is
most generally characterised by a classical random vari-
able Z. An n-bit key S is then said to be secure [20] if,
for some small ε ≥ 0,
H(S) ≥ n− ε (1)
I(S;Z) ≤ ε (2)
where H(S) denotes the Shannon entropy of S and
I(S;Z) := H(S) − H(S|Z) is the mutual information
between S and Z. Inequality (1) implies that S is al-
most uniformly distributed; it is thus an approximation
of condition (i) above. Similarly, (2) is an approximation
of (ii).
In quantum cryptography the knowledge of an adver-
sary on a (classical) key S is described by the state of
a quantum system E instead of a classical random vari-
able Z. Accordingly, the mutual information occurring in
criterion (2) is thus usually generalised to the accessible
information Iacc(S;E), which is defined as the mutual
information between S and the outcome Z of an optimal
measurement applied to E (see Section II for a formal
definition). The quantum version of (2) then reads
Iacc(S;E) ≤ ε . (2′)
Inequality (2′) seems to be a natural formalisation of the
requirement that an adversary has almost no informa-
tion on S and is in fact commonly used in the standard
literature on quantum cryptography and, in particular,
quantum key distribution [21]. However, as we shall see,
it is generally not sufficient to guarantee secrecy.
2The remaining part of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section II, we review the definition of accessible
information and its locking property. Section III is de-
voted to an explicit example of locking of the accessible
information. This example is then used in Section IV to
show that, even if the accessible information of an adver-
sary on the key S is arbitrarily small, S might still be
insecure for certain applications. Finally, in Section V,
we discuss an alternative security definition which over-
comes this problem.
II. LOCKING OF ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION
Let E be a quantum system whose state depends on
the value of a classical random variable V . This situa-
tion may be described using the so-called enlarged Hilbert
space representation by encoding the random variable V
into a quantum system with respect to an orthonormal
basis {|v〉}v∈V as follows:
ρV E :=
∑
v∈V
PV (v) |v〉〈v| ⊗ ρE|V=v ,
where ρE|V=v is the state of E conditioned on V = v. We
will refer to a state of this form as a {cq}-state. We will
also use generalisations of this convention to triparite sys-
tems with two classical parts and call the corresponding
states {ccq}-states.
For any {cq}-state ρV E , the accessible information (of
E on V ) is defined as [22]
Iacc(V ;E) := max
M
I(V ;Z)
where the maximum is over all local POVMs M on E
and where I(V ;Z) denotes the mutual information be-
tween V and the measurement outcome Z. The accessi-
ble information Iacc(V ;E) thus quantifies the amount of
information on the classical value V that can be obtained
by an optimal measurement applied to the quantum sys-
tem E.
Consider now an extended setting involving an addi-
tional random variable Y , that is, the situation is de-
scribed by a {ccq}-state ρV Y E . Let [23]
∆ := Iacc(V ;Y E)− Iacc(V ;E)
be the amount by which the accessible information on V
increases when Y is appended to E. The quantity ∆ thus
measures by how much the knowledge on V increases
if one learns Y (given access to the quantum system
E). Interestingly, ∆ can generally be larger than the
size of Y , i.e., the number of bits which are needed to
represent its value. This phenomenon is known as lock-
ing [1] and will be the main topic of the next section.
It should be emphasized that locking is a purely non-
classical property. In fact, if the quantum system E is
substituted by a classical random variable Z, we have
∆ = I(V ;Y |Z) ≤ H(Y ) [24], that is, ∆ cannot be larger
than the size of Y .
III. AN EXAMPLE OF LOCKING
In this section, we give an explicit example of locking.
Compared to previously known constructions [1, 2, 3], it
has some additional properties which are needed for our
considerations related to cryptography (see Section IV).
In order to formulate our example of locking, we use
the following notational conventions: σ1, σ2, σ3 are the
Pauli matrices on the Hilbert space C2. For any m-tuple
y = (y1, . . . , ym) on {1, 2, 3}, we denote by σy the m-fold
tensor product σy1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σym . Lemma 6 summarises
some properties of these operators, which we will use
repeatedly in the following.
Let X and Y be random variables on the binary set
X := {0, 1} and the set of m-tuples Y := {1, 2, 3}m,
respectively, such that the joint probability distribution
PXY is uniform. Moreover, for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, let
ρE|(X,Y )=(x,y) := 2
−m
(
id(C2)⊗m + (−1)xσy
)
(3)
be an operator on (C2)⊗m, representing the state of a
quantum system E conditioned on X = x and Y = y.
It is straightforward to check that this is a consistent
description of a {ccq}-state ρXYE [25].
Note that for any fixed y ∈ Y, the conditional quantum
states ρE|(X,Y )=(0,y) and ρE|(X,Y )=(1,y) are orthogonal.
In particular, given access to the quantum system E,
the value of X can be determined with certainty if Y is
known, that is, we have the following statement.
Lemma 1. Let ρXYE be the {ccq}-state defined above.
For any fixed value y ∈ Y of the random variable Y ,
there exists a measurement of the quantum system E with
output equal to X.
On the other hand, if the value of Y is unknown, then
any measurement on E reveals almost no information on
the pair (X,Y ).
Lemma 2. Let ρXYE be the {ccq}-state defined above.
Then Iacc(XY ;E) ≤
(
2
3
)m
2 .
Proof. We show that, for any measurement M applied
to the quantum part E of ρXYE with outcome Z, the
entropy of the pair (X,Y ) conditioned on Z is bounded
by
H(XY |Z) ≥ H(XY )− ( 23)m2 . (4)
The assertion then follows because Iacc(XY ;E) =
H(XY )−minMH(XY |Z).
Let N := {d · PXY (x, y) · ρE|(X,Y )=(x,y)}(x,y)∈X×Y
where d := 2m is the dimension of E. Because ρE is
the fully mixed state on E, N is a POVM on E. By a
similar derivation as in [1], it can be shown that
H(XY |Z) ≥ min
σ
H(N [σ]) (5)
3where the minimum ranges over all states σ on E and
H(N [σ]) is the entropy of the outcome when the mea-
surement N is applied to σ (see Lemma 5 in the Ap-
pendix).
Using the fact that ρY E = ρY ⊗ ρE where ρE is the
fully mixed state, the term in the minimum of (5) can be
rewritten as [26]
H(N [σ]) = H(Y ) + E
y←PY
[H(Ny[σ])] (6)
where, for any y ∈ Y, H(Ny[σ]) is the entropy of
the output of the POVM Ny := {d · PX|Y=y(x) ·
ρE|(X,Y )=(x,y)}x∈X applied to σ. Because for every y ∈ Y
the POVM Ny is binary-valued, this quantity is easy
to bound. More precisely, as the binary entropy func-
tion h(p) := −p log p− (1 − p) log(1− p) satisfies h(p) ≥
1− |p− (1 − p)| for every p ∈ [0, 1] and
| tr(σ(ρE|(X,Y )=(0,y) − ρE|(X,Y )=(1,y)))| = 2−m+1 tr(σyσ)
for every y ∈ Y and every state σ on (C2)⊗m, we obtain
by a straightforward calculation
E
y←PY
[H(Ny[σ])] ≥ 1− 1|Y|
∑
y∈Y
∣∣tr(σyσ)∣∣ . (7)
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives
1
|Y|
∑
y∈Y
∣∣tr(σyσ)∣∣ ≤ 1√|Y|
√∑
y∈Y
tr(σyσ)2 ≤
(
2
3
)m
2
,
(8)
where the last inequality is a consequence of the fact that
tr(σ2) ≤ 1 for every state σ on (C2)⊗m, which implies∑
y∈Y tr(σyσ)
2 ≤ 2m [cf. (11)]. Combining (8), (7), (6)
with (5) and using the fact that 1 + H(Y ) = H(XY )
implies (4) and thus concludes the proof.
Because of Lemma 1, we have Iacc(XY ;EY ) =
H(XY ). Hence, together with Lemma 2, we conclude
that the quantity ∆ = Iacc(XY ;EY ) − Iacc(XY ;E), as
defined in Section II, with V := (X,Y ), is arbitrarily
close to H(Y ) + 1. We thus have a locking effect: The
difference ∆ is larger than the size of Y .
IV. SMALL ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION
DOES NOT IMPLY SECRECY
The locking property of the accessible information
has dramatic implications for cryptography. To illus-
trate this, we consider an n-bit key S = (S1, . . . , Sn)
together with a quantum system E controlled by an
adversary such that, for some bijective mapping f ,
ρSnf(S1,...,Sn−1)E = ρXY E [27], where ρXYE is the {ccq}-
state as defined in Section III (for m ≈ n/ log2 3) [28].
It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 that the
key S satisfies the security criterion (2′) of Section I, i.e.,
Iacc(S;E) = Iacc(XY ;E) ≤ ε , (9)
where ε := e−
n−2
8 decreases exponentially fast in the key
length n. However, as illustrated by the following exam-
ple, this is not sufficient for certain applications.
Assume that the key S is used to encrypt an n-bit mes-
sageM = (M1, . . . ,Mn) by one-time pad encryption and
let C = (C1, . . . , Cn) be the corresponding ciphertext.
Moreover, assume that an adversary has some a priori
knowledge which fully determines the first n− 1 message
bits M1, . . . ,Mn−1 [29]. Upon receiving the ciphertext
bits C1, . . . , Cn−1, the adversary can thus easily infer the
first n−1 key bits S1, . . . , Sn−1. Hence, by Lemma 1, she
is now in a position to choose an appropriate measure-
ment of her quantum system E which reveals the nth key
bit Sn with certainty. The encryption of the nth message
bit Mn is thus completely insecure.
V. ALTERNATIVE SECURITY DEFINITION
According to the discussion in the previous section,
defining secrecy with respect to the accessible informa-
tion is problematic in a quantum world. This raises the
question whether there are stronger security definitions
which, e.g., imply that a secret key can safely be used for
one-time pad encryption. As shown recently [4, 5, 6], the
answer to this question is positive [30].
Let ρSE be a {cq}-state describing a classical key S
together with the quantum knowledge of an adversary,
i.e., ρSE :=
∑
s∈S PS(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρE|S=s where {|s〉}s∈S
are orthonormal states representing the value of S.
Definition 3 ([5, 6]). A random variable S on S is
called an ε-secure key with respect to E if [31]∥∥ρSE − ρU ⊗ ρE∥∥ ≤ ε ,
where ρU :=
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s〉〈s| is the completely mixed state.
As discussed in [5], ε-security has an intuitive inter-
pretation: With probability 1− ε, the key S can be con-
sidered identical to a perfectly secure key U , i.e., U is
uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary’s
information. In other words, Definition 3 guarantees that
the key S is perfectly secure except with probability ε.
Clearly, this is still true if S is used in any application.
Interestingly, this strong type of security can be
achieved quite easily. For example, it has been shown [5]
that the key computed by applying a two-universal hash
function to a random string with sufficient entropy satis-
fies Definition 3 [32]. Security proofs of QKD which are
based on this result (see, e.g., [7]) are thus not affected
by the problem discussed above.
The following lemma shows that strongly secure keys
can also be obtained by measuring predistributed Bell
4states |Φ+〉 (or approximations thereof). It follows from
this statement that security proofs based on entangle-
ment purification (where the entanglement is usually
measured in terms of the fidelity to a fully entangled
state, as, e.g., in [8, 9]) can easily be adapted to meet
Definition 3 [33] (see also [4]).
Lemma 4. Let ε ≥ 0 and let ρAB be a bipartite quantum
state such that F (ρAB, |Φ+〉⊗n) ≥
√
1− ε2. Then the two
n-bit strings resulting from local measurements of ρAB in
the computational basis are ε-secure keys (with respect to
an adversary holding a purification of ρAB).
Proof. According to Uhlmann’s theorem, there exists a
pure state |κ〉 and a purification |Θ〉 of ρAB with some
auxiliary system E such that
F (|Θ〉, |Φ+〉⊗n ⊗ |κ〉) = F (ρAB , |Φ+〉⊗n) .
Using the relation ‖ρ− σ‖ ≤ √1− F (ρ, σ)2 and the as-
sumption of the lemma, we find∥∥|Θ〉〈Θ| − (|Φ+〉〈Φ+| ⊗ |κ〉〈κ|)⊗n∥∥ ≤ ε .
Let ρSASBE be the {ccq}-state describing the situation
after measuring |Θ〉 with respect to the computational
basis in A and B. Because the trace distance can only
decrease under physical operations, we conclude∥∥ρSASBE − ρUU ⊗ σE∥∥ ≤ ε ,
where ρUU =
∑
s∈{0,1}n
1
2n |s〉〈s| ⊗ |s〉〈s|.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The setting considered in this paper consists of a clas-
sical n-bit string S = (S1, . . . , Sn) (for any n ∈ N) and a
quantum system E such that the following holds: (i) any
measurement on E chosen independently of S only re-
veals a negligible amount of information about S (i.e.,
Iacc(S;E) is exponentially small in n) and (ii) given the
first n − 1 bits of S, there exists a measurement on E
which determines the value of the nth bit with certainty
(i.e., Iacc(S;ES1, . . . , Sn−1) = n).
This example of locking reveals a weakness of security
definitions based on the accessible information as they are
used in the standard literature on quantum cryptography.
In particular, a secret key which is secure according to
such a definition might become completely insecure when
it is used in certain applications (Section IV). A possible
solution to this problem is to use the stronger yet still
achievable notion of ε-security (Section V): An ε-secure
key can safely be used in any application—except with
some (arbitrarily small) probability ε.
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APPENDIX
Let ρV E be a {cq}-state. Lemma 5 gives a lower bound
on the entropy of V conditioned on the outcome of any
measurement on E.
Lemma 5. Let ρV E be a {cq}-state with the property
that ρE is the completely mixed state on E. For some
fixed POVM M applied to E, let H(V |Z) be the entropy
of V conditioned on the outcome Z. Then
H(V |Z) ≥ min
σ
H(N [σ])
where σ ranges over all states on E and H(N [σ]) de-
notes the entropy of the outcome when the POVM N :=
{dim(E) · PV (v) · ρE|V=v}v∈V is applied to σ.
Proof. The fact that ρE is the completely mixed state on
E implies that N is a POVM. The same fact also implies
that the measurement result Z is distributed according to
PZ(z) =
tr(Mz)
d
for every outcome z, where d := dim(E)
andMz are the operators of the POVMM. This in turn
gives
PV |Z(v|z) =
PV (v) · PZ|V (z|v)
PZ(z)
=
tr(MzρE|V=v)
tr(Mz)
·d·PV (v) .
Hence
H(V |Z) ≥ min
z
H(V |Z = z) ≥ min
σ˜
H(P σ˜Z ) , (10)
where the minimum is over all non-zero operators σ˜ on
E with 0 ≤ σ˜ ≤ idE and P σ˜V is the distribution
P σ˜V (v) :=
tr(σ˜ρE|V=v)
tr(σ˜)
· d · PV (v) .
Note that for such an operator σ˜, the operator σ := σ˜tr(σ˜)
is a state on E. The assertion thus follows from (10) and
the observation that N [σ] ≡ P σ˜V .
The next lemma summarises some properties of tensor
products of Pauli operators. As in Section III, for any
m-tuple y = (y1, . . . , ym) on {0, 1, 2, 3}, σy denotes the
m-fold tensor product σy1 ⊗· · ·⊗σym of Pauli operators.
Lemma 6. The following holds for all m-tuples y, y′ ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}m.
(i) σ†y = σy
(ii) tr(σy) = 2
m · δy,0.
(iii) The eigenvalues of σy are {−1, 1}.
5(iv) tr(σ†yσy′) = 2
m · δy,y′ .
Lemma 6 implies that the operators {2−m2 ·
σy}y∈{0,1,2,3}m form an orthonormal basis of the space
of hermitian operators on (C2)⊗m with respect to the
Hilbert-Schmidt scalar product 〈A,B〉 := tr(A†B). In
particular, every state σ on (C2)⊗m can be written in
the so-called generalised Bloch representation as
σ = 2−m
∑
y∈{0,1,2,3}m
tr(σyσ)σy , (11)
where the coefficients tr(σyσ) are real-valued.
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